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STRICT LIABILITY AND POSSESSION OF CONTRABAND:
THE MARYLAND APPROACH
The author examines the purpose of and the limitations on
imposing strict liability for conduct deemed injurious to the
public. He considers the applicability of strict liability to the
unlawful possession of contraband and the importance of
knowledge as an element of possession. After comparing the
positions of the majority of jurisdictions and that taken by
Maryland, the author concludes that the Maryland position is
neither consistent nor justified.
Until the nineteenth century it had been an established principle of
law that the existence of a criminal mind was essential to imposing
criminal responsibility.' The foundation of criminal justice was that an
evil intent was the essence of an offense.2 However, during the last
century both the English and American courts began construing crimi-
nal statutes that failed to mention any mental element as imposing
strict liability upon certain conduct.3 Previously, where a penal statute
was silent as to the mental element, the courts had construed it in favor
of the accused by implying a requirement of mens rea) This construc-
tion gradually gave way to a literal construction of such statutes.' The
implication of a requirement of mens rea was abandoned and convic-
tions came to be based merely upon forbidden conduct irrespective of
intent.6
Most statutes which were subjected to a literal interpretation "re-
sulted from the need for social regulation brought about by the indus-
trial revolution" 7 and were generally of a purely regulatory or adminis-
trative nature. They were enacted to prevent an injury of a widespread
and public character. These regulations have traditionally been given
the name public welfare offenses.'
1. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 75, at 216 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS].
2. 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 287 (7th ed. 1882).
3. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56, 62 (1933) [hereinafter cited as
Sayre].
4. "Mens Rea" is the awareness of all those facts which make conduct criminal. United
States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1137(4th ed.
1968), defines "mens rea" as: "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent."
5. WILLIAMS at 217-18.
6. Id.
7. Remington & Helstad, The Mental Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952 WIs.
L. REV. 644, 670.
8. Sayre, supra note 3.
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FOUNDATIONS OF STRICT LIABILITY
Early in the development of strict liability the desire to protect the
public was recognized as a justification for dispensing with the mental
element.
Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general
good .... It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which
the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the
law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage
ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men
know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly out-
weighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales.9
In public welfare offenses strict liability has been adopted "in order
to simplify the investigation and prosecution of violations of statutes
designed to control mass conduct."' 0 An example of such offenses are
those involving adulterated food and beverages. Such offenses typically
carry only monetary penalties, rarely imprisonment.' In an early
English case' 2 the defendant was convicted of having in his possession
adulterated tobacco and was fined £200. Baron Parke expressed a
common justification for not requiring a mental element in such of-
fenses when he said that "the public inconvenience would be much
greater, if in every case the officers were obliged to prove knowl-
edge."' ' The protection to be given society outweighed that customar-
ily afforded to the individual in the requirement of scienter as a
prerequisite to punishment.'"
This desire to protect society has inspired the development of this
"special type of regulatory offense involving a social injury so direct
and widespread and a penalty so light that in such exceptional cases
courts could safely override the interests of innocent individual defend-
ants and punish without proof of any guilty intent."' ' When the
penalty has consisted of a heavy fine or imprisonment, scienter has
generally been required as an element of the offense.
In another early English case,' 6 the defendant was convicted of
bigamy for marrying within seven years after she had been deserted by
her husband. The jury found that at the time of her second marriage
she reasonably believed in good faith that her husband was dead. In
support of the decision to quash the conviction, Justice Wills wrote:
[T] he nature and extent of the penalty attached to the offense
may reasonably be considered. There is nothing that need shock
9. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881) [hereinafter cited as HOLMES].
10. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 423 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Hart].
11. Id. at 72.
12. Regina v. Woodrow, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846).
13. Id. at 913.
14. Accord, Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 489 (1864).
15. Sayre, supra note 3, at 68.
16. Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).
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any mind in the payment of a small pecuniary penalty by a
person who has unwittingly done something detrimental to the
public interest. To subject him, when what he has done has
been nothing but what any well-disposed man would have been
very likely to do under the circumstances, to the forfeiture of
all his goods and chattels . . . to the loss of civil rights, to
imprisonment with hard labour, or even to penal servitude, is a
very different matter; and such a fate seems properly reserved
for those who have transgressed morally as well as unintention-
ally done something prohibited by law ......
In a leading American case,1 8 the imposition of strict liability was
rejected, and the Court reversed the defendant's conviction for violating
a federal statute making it a crime to embezzle, steal, purloin, or
knowingly convert government property.1 The defendant carried
away and sold bomb casings which had accumulated on a government
bombing range. The trial court rejected defendant's argument that he
believed the casings to be abandoned. The jury was instructed that a
lack of criminal intent was no defense. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that scienter was essential to this offense. In reviewing the
nature of public welfare offenses the Court asserted that the accused
was usually in a position to prevent the particular harm with no more
care than society might reasonably expect of the individual. Further-
more, under such offenses the penalties usually are light and conviction
causes no serious harm to an offender's reputation.
The principle that the interests of the public must outweigh the
interests of the individual when strict liability is to be applied was
expressed in another American decision.2 0 A corporate officer was
convicted of violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938.2 After purchasing drugs from a manufacturer, the defendant's
company replaced the original labels with its own and shipped the drugs
in interstate commerce. In upholding the conviction the Court classified
the particular legislation as that type where penalties serve as effective
means of regulation and thus dispensed with the requirement of mens
rea. The Court spoke of putting the burden of acting at hazard upon an
innocent person who stands in a responsible relation to a public danger.
In the interest of the greater good, the intent of Congress was to place
the burden upon those who have the opportunity of informing them-
selves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of
consumers. The balancing of relative hardships was in favor of the
public who had no other protection against the evil to be avoided.
17. Id. at 177. Contra, Braun v. State, 230 Md. 82, 185 A.2d 905 (1962) (the court concluded
that knowledge or mens rea was not necessary to a conviction for bigamy and equated
bigamy with various police regulations where scienter is unnecessary); Commonwealth v.
Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472 (1844).
18. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1966).
20. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
21. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1972).
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To summarize, the rationale for imposing strict liability upon con-
duct is that society needs protection from certain harmful acts which
affect it in a direct and widespread manner. To effectively counter such
conduct the public tolerates dispensing with a mental element so as to
simplify the enforcement of statutes intended to control it. Yet, in
dispensing with the traditional requirement of scienter in such statutes,
it is considered desirable to impose only light penalties for such
offenses.
UNCONSCIOUS POSSESSION AS A CRIME IN MARYLAND
Although strict liability is commonly applied to public welfare of-
fenses, it should not be applied to criminal statutes that impose heavy
penalties for acts which the accused could not reasonably have avoided
or have known to be criminal.' 2 Nevertheless, in certain types of
offenses strict liability has been imposed when the prescribed penalties
are not minimal and the statutes not merely regulatory. One such type
of offense is the unlawful possession of contraband.' 3 The question is
whether possession should be conscious, i.e. should knowledge, either
of the presence or the character of the article or both, be an element of
the definition of possession and thus required to be proven by the
prosecution.
The word possession has been given a variety of judicial defini-
tions.2 4 The majority of the state courts have asserted that knowledge
is an element when the word possession is used in the context of a
criminal statute. Under the majority rule, 2 5 possession of contraband is
not criminal unless conscious. However, Maryland has apparently failed
or refused to recognize a distinction between mere police regulations
and more serious offenses of possession.
The leading Maryland case is Ford v. State,2 6 where the defendant
was convicted of violating the lottery laws2 7 by possessing lottery slips.
22. For a discussion of the role which strict liability plays in modern criminal justice, see
Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960).
23. The term contraband as used herein will refer to articles declared unlawful for possession
except under authorized conditions.
24. Goodhart, Possession o Drugs & Absolute Liability, 84 L.Q. REV. 382 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Ritter v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
26. 85 Md. 465, 37 A. 172 (1897).
27. If any person shall bring into this State any lottery ticket, policy. certificate or
anything by which the vendor or person promises or guarantees that any particular
character, ticket or certificate shall in any event, or on the happening of any
contingency in the nature of a lottery, entitle the purchaser or holder to receive
money, property or evidence of debt, or if any person shall have in his possession in
this state any book, list, slip or record of the numbers drawn in any lottery, whether
in this State or elsewhere, or any book, list, slip or record of any lottery ticket, or
anything in the nature thereof mentioned in this section, or of any money received
or to be received from, or for the sale of any such lottery ticket or thing in the nature
thereof as aforesaid he shall be liable to indictment, and upon conviction shall in
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In the trial court the defendant offered evidence to show that he did
not know he was in possession of the contraband. An exception was
taken to a ruling prohibiting introduction of the evidence. In affirming
the conviction the court held that lack of knowledge or the absence of
mens rea was not a defense, and thus evidence tending to show lack of
knowledge was not admissible. In noting the socially debilitating effect
of lotteries upon the public2 s and the difficulty for the state to prove
mens rea, the court reasoned that the legislature could, as a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the state, legitimately impose criminal
liability for the unconscious possession of items declared to be contra-
band.2 9
When the alleged criminal activity is unlawful possession of contra-
band, the state has no burden to prove a particular mental state, and
the accused has no opportunity to prove an innocent intent. The only
defenses available to the accused are "that the articles charged in the
indictment were not found in his possession, or that those found were
not such as the law prohibited him from having." 3" No matter how
heavily the evidence would imply lack of knowledge, it will make no
difference as to liability since knowledge is not an element of the
offense.
Although the question of defendant's knowledge is not an issue, the
prosecutor is permitted to weigh the evidence as to the defendant's
mental state. The Ford court commented:
If a reputable person satisfies the prosecuting officer that he
came into possession of it [lottery slips] in an innocent way, it
is not likely the prosecution would be continued, or if the court
be informed of such facts it could take it into consideration in
imposing the penalty, and could fine him fifteen cents or less,
which would relieve him of the costs.
3 '
the discretion of the court be fined any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, or
shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year, or shall be both fined and
imprisoned; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to any person who
may have possession of any of the articles herein mentioned, for the purpose of
procuring or furnishing evidence of violations of any of the provisions of law relating
to lotteries.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 362 (1971), as amended, Law of May 24, 1973, ch. 774, § -,
[1973] Laws of Md. _.
28. Maryland presently has a state operated lottery for the purpose of raising revenue. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 88D, §§ 1-23 (Supp. 1972).
29. Contra, State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951). The defendant was accused of
unlawfully and knowingly possessing certain papers pertaining to a lottery policy. In
affirming a dismissal of the indictment the court stated:
The criminal mind is not essential where the Legislature has so willed. The doer of
the act may be liable criminally even though he does not know the act is criminal
and does not purpose to transgress the law. But it is quite another thing to assess
with criminal or penal consequences the unknowing "possession" of contraband
articles. That would constitute an abuse of the police power.
Id. at 149, 80 A.2d at 623.
30. Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 480, 37 A. 172, 175 (1897).
31. Id. at 477, 37 A. at 174.
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The result of permitting such a decision to be made by the prosecuting
attorney is that, when the defendant stands before him, knowledge is
an element of the offense; yet, when the defendant stands before the
jury knowledge disappears as an element. The prosecutor holds what
amounts to an informal trial of what he conceives to be the accused's
culpability.3 2 If he decides the accused is guilty, he prosecutes.
This argument reasserts the traditional position that a criminal
conviction imports moral condemnation. To this, it adds the
arrogant assertion that it is proper to visit the moral condemna-
tion of the community upon one of its members on the basis
solely of the private judgment of his prosecutors. Such a cir-
cumvention of the safeguards with which the law surrounds
other determinations of criminality seems not only irrational,
but immoral as well. 3
In addition to forbidding the introduction of evidence tending to
prove knowledge or the lack thereof, the Ford court rejected the
defendant's contention that such a statute merely shifted the burden of
proof of lack of knowledge from the state to the defendant, since such
an opportunity would make the statute practically useless and be a
temptation to perjury.3 4 The court was concerned that the accused
would swear that he came into possession innocently and the state
would be unable to prove otherwise.
The influence of Ford can be seen in such Maryland possession
offenses as violations of the narcotics laws.3 ' In Jenkins u. State3 6 the
court took the same position with respect to possession of narcotics as
Ford did in regard to possession of lottery slips. The defendant had
removed a package from under the sink of a gasoline station men's
room. At his trial the defendant testified that he found the package
containing the narcotics on the floor of the washroom, and that he
took it because he thought it might contain money or some other
valuable. He asserted that he did not know it contained marijuana. In
affirming the conviction the court held that it was unnecessary for the
state to prove mens rea. In Jenkins, the court adopted the rationale of
the Ford court and deplored the deleterious effect narcotic drug ad-
diction has upon the public health, morals, safety and welfare. The
32. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 256.
33. Hart, supra note 10, at 424.
34. Contrary to Ford, it would be sounder policy to retain the guilty mind element and to shift
the burden of proof to the defendant to establish lack of guilty intent. With the possibility
of heavy penalities, "the defendant should not be denied the right of bringing forward
affirmative evidence to prove that the violation was the result of no fault on his part."
Sayre, supra note 3, at 79. Under this policy the jury could find that the defendant's
testimony was insufficent to meet the burden.
35. "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell,
prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized in
this subtitle .... Law of March 29, 1935, ch. 59, § 1, [1935] Laws of Md. 91, as amended,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287 (1971).
36. 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115 (1957).
19731
Baltimore Law Review
Jenkins court also embraced the Ford court's declaration that a lack of
guilty knowledge may only mitigate punishment.
POSSESSION AS DEFINED BY OTHER STATES
Maryland's position as expressed in Ford and Jenkins, compared with
that of other states, is notable for its harshness. This characteristic was
expressed in an Oregon case, State v. Cox,3" in which a hotel porter
was convicted of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquors by carrying
a suitcase containing the contraband from a train to the hotel. In
reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court of Oregon stressed the
evil inherent in imposing criminal responsibility for unconscious posses-
sion:
In the discharge of his duties the defendant did not have the
right of search, and did not have any choice or discretion in the
taking or handling of the baggage of a guest. If the mere act of a
porter in lifting a suitcase which contains intoxicating liquors is
within itself a violation of the statute in question, then any
minister, old lady, or the most radical Prohibitionist, through
chance or design might be made the innocent victim of having
intoxicating liquor in his or her possession, and . . . could be
convicted of that offense. s
The thrust of Cox is that in construing the applicable criminal statute,
the interests of due process outweigh the desire to protect the health,
safety, welfare and morals of society. 3 '
In a number of possession cases where knowledge was required as an
element of the crime, a distinction has been made between knowledge
of the article's presence and of its character. In People v. Gory,4" the
defendant was an inmate of a prison farm at the time of his arrest for
the unlawful possession of marijuana. The contraband was found in a
metal box issued to the defendant. The box could not be locked. When
the prisoners were absent it was customary for one man to remain
behind to watch the inmates' property. At the trial the defendant
stated that he had never seen the marijuana before it was removed from
37. 91 Ore. 518, 179 P. 575 (1919).
38. Id. at 532, 179 P. at 579.
39. In State v. Neel, __ Ore. _ 493 P.2d 740 (1972), involving a prosecution for the possession
of marijuana, the court said:
[A]s a general rule of statutory construction, all criminal statutes should be
interpreted as requiring proof of some culpable element. If the legislature desires to
impose strict criminal liability on any conduct, it can expressly do so. Since the
statutes in question do not expressly impose strict liability for the possession of
narcotics and dangerous drugs, we interpret the statute as requiring proof of some
mental element.
Id. at -, 493 P.2d at 742.
40. 28 Cal. 2d 450, 170 P.2d 433 (1946).
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the box. On appeal, the defendant challenged the propriety of the trial
court's action in twice reading certain instructions and then expressly
withdrawing them. One of the withdrawn instructions directed that the
jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew of the contraband's presence. In reversing the judgment and the
order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the court held that
"the law makes the matter of knowledge in relation to defendant's
awareness of the presence of the object a basic element of the offense
of possession." 4 '
Subsequent to Gory the California court specifically considered
whether knowledge of the contraband's character was an element of
possession. In People v. Winston4 2 the defendant was convicted of
furnishing marijuana to minors and of illegal possession of marijuana
found in his apartment. The defendant had rented his apartment to a
tenant while he was out of town. At the time of his arrest the
defendant had occupied his apartment for approximately three weeks
since his return. One of his contentions on appeal was that the lower
court erroneously refused to give an instruction offered by him that
knowledge of the narcotic character of the article possessed is an
element of the offense of possession. In agreeing with the defendant,
the court reviewed Gory and concluded that under that case knowledge
of the contraband's character was an element.4 Although the question
presented by Gory was whether the accused had knowledge of the
presence of the contraband, the court found that the character "con-
cept of knowledge is implicit in the discussion of the basic principles
involved."' Thus, when proof of a conscious possession is required,
not only should it be established that the accused was conscious of the
contraband's presence, but also that he knew that the article was
contraband.4 s
The actual proof of the requisite knowledge is one of the more
controversial points in a discussion of this area of the criminal law.
Those states in which knowledge is not an element of possession usually
rest their opposition to such a requirement partly upon the alleged
impossibility of producing the necessary proof of the defendant's
mental state.4 6 This line of reasoning has not been followed by most
states, yet the prosecution has been able to establish a conscious
possession by means of circumstantial evidence from which a jury may
infer knowledge.
In the North Dakota case of State v. Schuck,4' the defendant was
41. Id. at 454, 170 P.2d at 436.
42. 46 Cal. 2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956).
43. Accord, State v. Giddings, 67 N.M. 87, 352 P.2d 1003 (1960); State v. Neel, __ Ore. -, 493
P.2d 740 (1972).
44. 46 Cal. 2d at 159, 293 P.2d at 45.
45. In public welfare offenses, such as possessing adulterated foods and beverages, there is no
requirement of knowledge of the article's character.
46. Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 37 A. 172 (1897).
47. 51 N.D. 875, 201 N.W. 342 (1924).
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convicted of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors. The con-
traband was discovered on his premises, part of which were used as a
store. The store was maintained downstairs in the front part of the
premises. The testimony was conflicting as to where the liquor was
discovered. The arresting officers stated that the contraband was found
in a back storeroom, while the defendant's wife asserted that it was
found in the kitchen in the back of the premises. According to the wife,
prior to the arrival of the officers, a stranger had come to the back door
requesting to be permitted to leave a box in the kitchen until it was to
be called for later. The package was allegedly placed on the stove and
remained there until found. Both the defendant and his wife denied any
knowledge of the contents of the package. There was "no direct
testimony tending to show that the defendant Schuck had any knowl-
edge of the presence of" the liquor containers "or that their contents
were intoxicating."4 s On appeal the contention was made that the trial
court had misdirected the jury. Defendant's exception was to the
following instruction: "In the absence of any proof that the defendant
did not know there was intoxicating liquor on his premises, you may
presume that a man knows the condition of his own place, his home,
his store, and the property therein, if the circumstances shown warrant
this."4 ' In affirming the conviction the court rejected the argument
that this instruction put upon the defendant the burden of proving his
lack of knowledge. In another part of the instruction the lower court
had clearly stated that the burden was upon the state to prove knowl-
edge of the contraband's presence beyond a reasonable doubt. The
instruction merely created an inference of fact which was rebuttable by
facts and circumstances indicating the contrary. In other words, the
defendant's ownership and control of the premises was a circumstance
sufficient to raise an inference of knowledge, unless overcome by
circumstances which would imply a lack of knowledge. If mere owner-
ship and control would be enough to establish knowledge, the burden
upon the state is hardly "impossible."
The prosecution is usually in a position to prove knowledge by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence.' 0 However, the evidence must
so link the accused to the contraband that the inference of knowledge
may be fairly drawn.' The existence of such a link was the issue
before the Oklahoma court in Brown v. State,"2 where the defendant
was convicted of possession of marijuana. Police officers were in the
process of searching an apartment when appellant and a co-defendant
entered. No clothing or personal property of the appellant was found
on the premises, nor was any marijuana found on his person; however, a
residue of marijuana was found in the apartment. The appellant had
48. Id. at 880, 201 N.W. at 344.
49. Id.
50. But see State v. Eberhardt, 176 Neb. 18, 125 N.W.2d 1 (1963).
51. Carrol v. State, 90 Ariz. 411, 368 P.2d 649 (1962).
52. 481 P.2d 475 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
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stayed in the apartment only on the day of the search. The apartment
was never locked and was frequented by several persons at various
times. In reversing the conviction the court found that mere prox-
imity'5  or presence1 4 was insufficient to establish knowledge of the
presence of contraband and dominion and control of it. Being in the
presence of other persons having possession will not impart possession
to an accused. The court stated: "There must be some link or circum-
stance in addition to the presence of the marijuana which indicates
defendant Brown's knowledge of its presence and his control of it.
Absent this additional independent factor the evidence is insufficient to
support conviction." ' '
In spite of the qualification that the circumstances must establish a
link and reasonably imply knowledge, the production of the necessary
factors has not been difficult. In People v. Mack,"6 an Illinois case
involving a conviction for the unlawful possession of heroin, the con-
duct of the defendant prior to a raid on his apartment, coupled with
the presence of the contraband in the apartment, was sufficient to
establish knowledge. Acting upon information provided by an inform-
ant, police officers executed a search warrant in an apartment rented by
the defendant. In the morning on the day of the search, the defendant
left the apartment by a rear door, descended to the ground by a fire
escape, then walked to a car in which he drove away. The apartment
was not used as a habitation and only the defendant, by his own
admission, had access to the premises. In ruling that the defendant's
activity prior to the search was sufficient to prove knowledge, the court
reasoned that the "prosecution may meet its burden of proving the
knowledge essential to a conviction for possession by evidence of acts,
declarations or conduct of the accused from which the inference may
be fairly drawn that he knew of existence of the narcotics at the place
they were found."5 Presenting to a jury the conduct of the accused
prior to his arrest and eliciting his declarations do not seem to be so
extremely difficult as to place an impossible burden upon the prosecu-
tion.
In addition to the actual circumstances of the offense committed,
the prosecution has still another aid in proving the mental element in
possession. Although it is an established common law rule that in a
criminal prosecution proof of unrelated crimes is incompetent and
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the crime charged,5 it is a
recognized exception to the rule that whenever knowledge is an essen-
53. Accord, Harvy v. State, 487 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
54. Accord, People v. Gory, 28 Cal. 2d 450, 170 P.2d 443 (1946).
55. 481 P.2d at 478.
56. 12 I1. 2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609 (1957).
57. Id. at 159, 145 N.E.2d at 612.
58. Faust v. United States, 163 U.S. 452 (1896); Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 196
Md. 36, 75 A.2d 239 (1950); People v. Thau, 219 N.Y. 39, 113 N.E. 556 (1916); State v.
Reineke, 89 Ohio St. 390, 106 N.E. 52 (1914).
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tial element of the crime charged, evidence is admissible which tends to
establish the accused's knowledge." 9 For example, evidence showing a
sale of narcotics may be introduced in a prosecution for possession
when it tends to establish knowledge.'0 Such a rule makes the prosecu-
tion's task easier.
The various reasons set forth in Ford and Jenkins for not defining
possession to include the element of knowledge lose their credibility in
light of the decisions reviewed above. Yet, as much as these decisions
may go to undermine the persuasiveness of Ford and Jenkins, subse-
quent Maryland cases may have weakened them even more.
MARYLAND LAW AFTER FORD AND JENKINS
Recent Maryland cases indicate that the reasoning of Ford and
Jenkins is not accepted in cases involving joint possession of contra-
band. When the circumstances are such that more than one person is in
a position to control the contraband, knowledge has been a required
element of the offense. This consideration of the mental element is in
sharp contrast to the consistent refusal of the Maryland courts to
consider evidence relating to defendant's mental state in cases such as
Ford and Jenkins, where only one defendant is involved.
In Davis v. State6' the appellants leased an apartment. Davis had
spent only two nights a week there for three months and was not
present at the time marijuana was sold by the co-defendant, Green.
Davis was present later when a search was made of the apartment by
the police. At that time needle marks were found on his arms and
armpits. During the search narcotics were found in a metal box on the
coffee table. In reversing Davis' conviction for possession of the mari-
juana sold by Green, the court stated that his ownership of the premises
and association with Green were insufficient to convict him. The court
said: "We think this, without more, too thin a nexus upon which to
predicate guilt ... "6 2 On the other hand, the court affirmed his
conviction of possession and control of the contraband found in the
metal box while he was present. The court thought that the location of
the box and the needle marks on Davis permitted "an inference that he
knew of the presence of, and was directly connected with" the contra-
band.6 3 The court implied that under the circumstances, knowledge
can be inferred. But, in light of Ford and Jenkins, what need is there
for such an inference?
The subject of inferred knowledge was again considered in Wilkins v.
59. Wallace v. State, 77 Nev. 123, 359 P.2d 739 (1961); State v. Salte, 54 S.D. 536, 223
N.W. 733 (1929).
60. State v. Hennings, 3 Wash. App. 483, 475 P.2d 926 (1970).
61. 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970).
62. Id. at 55, 262 A.2d at 583.
63. Id.
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State.6 4 The appellants were common law spouses. The husband owned
a three story dwelling and occupied a bedroom on the middle floor.
The other floors were rented out and their occupants had free access,
by use of internal stairways, to other parts of the house. Under a bed in
a room identified as the husband's was found a piece of aluminum foil
containing two capsules of heroin. The wife's daughter had at one time
slept in the room and testified to having put the two capsules beside the
bed. The jury decided that the appellants had exclusive control of the
bedroom and attributed very little weight to the evidence and the
credibility of the daughter. The court quoted Davis: "It has been held
that where one has exclusive possession of a home or apartment in
which prohibited narcotics are found, it may be inferred, even in the
absence of other incriminating evidence, that such person knew of the
presence of the narcotics and had control of them ... "6 . Again, such
an inference would not even be considered under the standards an-
nounced in Ford and Jenkins.
Subsequent to Wilkins an analysis of cases dealing with the joint
possession of narcotics was made in Folk v. State.6 6 The appellant was
a child adjudged to be a delinquent. Her delinquent conduct was the
possession and control of marijuana. Appellant was arrested along with
five others when she was in a parked automobile. The evidence with
certainty showed that someone in the car was smoking marijuana. In
affirming the lower court, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
The common thread running through all of these cases af-
firming joint possession is 1) proximity between the defendant
and the contraband, 2) the fact that the contraband was within
the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the defendant,
3) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the
automobile in which the contraband is found, or 4) the pres-
ence of circumstances from which a reasonable inference could
be drawn that the defendant was participating with others in
the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.6 7
On the other hand, in cases negating joint possession, lack of knowledge
has been a common thread.6"
In Rettman v. State6 9 the appellant was convicted in a non-jury trial
of various charges involving possession of cocaine. Appellant had gone
with a co-defendant in appellant's car to the scene of a narcotics
transaction. The transaction was an exchange of hashish for cocaine and
a sum of cash. The seller of the hashish was an undercover narcotics
agent. The appellant left the motel room to get a metal container out of
64. 11 Md. App. 113, 273 A.2d 236 (1971), cert. denied, 261 Md. 730 (1971).
65. Id. at 127, 273 A.2d at 243.
66. 11 Md. App. 508, 275 A.2d 184 (1971).
67. Id. at 518, 275 A.2d at 189.
68. Id. at 514, 275 A.2d at 187.
69. 15 Md. App. 666, 292 A.2d 107 (1972), cert. denied, 266 Md. 741 (1972).
19731
Baltimore Law Review
his automobile and upon returning handed it to the co-defendant. The
metal container held the cocaine. In the lower court both the co-de-
fendant and the appellant denied that appellant knew that cocaine was
in the can. They further denied that appellant knew that cocaine was
connected with the transaction. The lower court did not believe them.
In affirming the conviction the court said that the lower court "was
under no obligation to believe the protestations of innocence on the
part of the appellant, nor the exculpatory statements .... relative to
appellant's alleged lack of knowledge of the presence of cocaine in the
metal container or in appellant's automobile." 7 0 The credibility of the
defendant's testimony is unimportant. What is notable is that the trial
court considered evidence which tended to show a lack of knowledge.
The admission of this evidence is inconsistent with the holdings of Ford
and Jenkins.
The admission of evidence tending to show knowledge in the joint
possession cases is inconsistent with the court's reasoning in Ford and
Jenkins. The asserted social harm in possession of contraband is present
in both sole and joint possession situations. The burden of proving
scienter in joint possession is as difficult as it is in sole possession, if not
more so. Finally, in both situations the court is construing the same
statute. The inconsistency between the joint possession cases and Ford
and Jenkins seriously undermines the foundation of the latter cases.
CONCLUSION
The Maryland court should, upon the next opportunity, attempt to
explain these inconsistencies or join the ranks of the majority of
jurisdictions by expressly overruling Ford and Jenkins. The absence of
mens rea as an element of possession of contraband is not justified by
the reasoning of these cases. The possibility of heavy penalties, the
harshness of imposing these penalties upon an accused whose conduct
may be faultless, and the demonstrated ability of the prosecution to
establish a mental link between the accused and the contraband to-
gether would seem to indicate that the interests of the public are not
sufficient to outweigh those of the accused and thus to deny to him an
opportunity to establish that he is without fault. Failure by the court
to make knowledge an element in contraband possession offenses
carrying criminal penalties would mandate legislative response expressly
requiring scienter in contraband possession statutes.
Ronald R. Jewell
70. Id. at 673, 292 A.2d at 111.
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